Dr. Danilo Samà
«This was one of the best things about Lennon and McCartney,
the competitive element within the team.
It was great. But hard to live with».
Dr. Danilo Samà
Competition Economist (Ph.D.)
Ph.D. in Economic Analysis of Competition Law
LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome - Faculty of Economics
(Fields of Academic Research and Professional Occupation: Competition Policy)
(Italy, 1984). Ph.D. (Doctory of Philosophy) in Economic Analysis of Competition Law, XXV cicle, LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome, Faculty of Economics, Italy (2014), defending the dissertation “Essays on Economic Analysis of Competition Law: Theory and Practice”. Ph.D. Visiting Researcher in Quantitative Economics at the Toulouse School of Economics, France, focusing on econometrics techniques and industrial organization applied to competition policy (2013). European Master in Economic Analysis of Law, attending the Erasmus Rotterdam University, The Netherlands, the Ghent University, Belgium, and the University of Hamburg, Germany (2011): dissertation in Economic Analysis of Competition Law under the supervision of Prof. Thomas Eger (University of Hamburg) and the examination of Prof. Elena Argentesi (University of Bologna) about the antitrust economic treatment of discount and rebates (3rd best thesis). For the Master, he awarded the Erasmus Mundus Scholarship granted by the European Commission, being for merit first ranked over 800 students worldwide. M.Sc. Master of Science Degree cum summa laude in Economic Analysis of Law at LUISS, Faculty of Economics (2009), with a dissertation in Economics Analysis of Competition Law under the supervision of Prof. Roberto Pardolesi about the relationship between competition and regulation in the telecommunication markets: to prepare the thesis, he spent a visiting research period at the School of Business and Social Sciences, University of Aarhus, Denmark (2008). B.Sc. Bachelor of Science Degree cum summa laude in Economics at LUISS, Faculty of Economics (2006), with a dissertation in Industrial Organization under the supervision of Sen. Prof. Carlo Scognamiglio about the liberalization and privatization of the energy markets, focusing on the antitrust judgement against ENI for abuse of dominant position which led the Italian Competition Authority to impose the highest fine ever levied in Italy.
Dr. Danilo Samà works as Competition Economist at CDC Cartel Damage Claims in Brussels (Belgium) since 2014. In 2011-2012 he worked as Competition Economist Trainee at the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission for the Unit 03 - State Aid Case Support directed by Mr. Koen Van de Casteele, supporting the Deputy Director General for State Aids Dr. Gert-Jan Koopman and the Chief Economist Team’s State Aids Adviser Dr. Vincent Verouden. In 2009-2010 he worked as Competition Economist at Pavia & Ansaldo in the antitrust department directed by Mr. Stefano Grassani, working on cases before the European Commission and the Italian Competition Authority concerning abuses of dominant position, cartel investigations, mergers and state aids.
Dr. Danilo Samà is Research Fellow at the LUISS’s Law & Economics LAB for the Competition Law & Economics area (www.law-economics.net) and the Editor-in-Chief of Competition Policy News (www.competition-policy-news.com), web-site which reports all the latest news worldwide concerning competition policy which are released by authorities, economists, lawyers and universities. He is a member of the Italian Antitrust Association. His main fields of academic interest and professional occupation concern antitrust, competition and regulation, which he has experienced in Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands.
Cartel Detection and Collusion Screening:
An Empirical Analysis of the London Metal Exchange
Dr. Danilo Samà
In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s Law, otherwise known as First-Digit Law, which has been successfully employed to discover the “Libor Scandal” much time before the opening of the cartel settlement procedure. Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to apply a such useful instrument to track the price of the aluminium traded on the London Metal Exchange, following the allegations according to which there would be an aluminium cartel behind. As a result, quick tests such as Benford’s Law can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show signs of collusion. Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are commonly subject to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available, as warning system to identify cases that require further investigations.
Samà, D. (2016), Cartel Detection and Collusion Screening: An Empirical Analysis of the London Metal Exchange, in Kovač, M., Vandenberghe, A.S. (eds.), Economic Evidence in EU Competition Law, European Studies in Law and Economics, Vol. 18, Intersentia Ltd., Cambridge, United Kingdom, pp. 203-2012.
Is Competition Policy Useful for Emerging Countries? An Empirical Analysis
Prof. Roberto Pardolesi & Dr. Danilo Samà
The ultimate objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in emerging countries, focusing on broader indicators of market performance in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, hence an effective utility, on the level of competition of a developing country. From a policy perspective, the aim of the paper is also to assess whether the enforcement of a competition policy regime in a developing country has the same beneficial effects on the intensity of competition usually claimed to take place in the most developed countries. Relying upon a dataset and the connected econometric model developed by one of the authors, we provisionally conclude that in developing countries the institutional quality of the competition authorities matters more than the mere existence or the degree of competence for the effectiveness of a competition policy regime.
Pardolesi, R., Samà, D. (2015), Is Competition Policy Useful for Emerging Countries? An Empirical Analysis, in Bellantuomo, G., Lara, F.T. (eds.), Law, Development and Innovation, SxI - Springer for Innovation \ SxI - Springer per l’Innovazione, Vol. 13, Springer International Publishing, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 25-38.
Essays on Economic Analysis of Competition Law: Theory and Practice
Dr. Danilo Samà
The present book is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics in France, as well as through professional experiences at the Antitrust Department of Pavia & Ansaldo and the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission.