Home » Research

Research

 

Books

 

Is Competition Policy Useful for Emerging Countries? An Empirical Analysis

Authors:
Prof. Roberto Pardolesi (LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome)
Dr. Danilo Samà (CDC Cartel Damage Claims)

Abstract:
The ultimate objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in emerging countries, focusing on broader indicators of market performance in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, hence an effective utility, on the level of competition of a developing country. From a policy perspective, the aim of the paper is also to assess whether the enforcement of a competition policy regime in a developing country has the same beneficial effects on the intensity of competition usually claimed to take place in the most developed countries. Relying upon a dataset and the connected econometric model developed by one of the authors, we provisionally conclude that in developing countries the institutional quality of the competition authorities matters more than the mere existence or the degree of competence for the effectiveness of a competition policy regime.

Keywords:
Competition Authorities, Competition Policy, Developing Countries, Economic Development, Economic Growth, Law & Economics, Market Concentration, Market Efficiency, Market Performance, New Institutional Economics, Political Economy

Citation:
Pardolesi, R., Samà, D. (2015), Is Competition Policy Useful for Emerging Countries? An Empirical Analysis, in Bellantuomo, G., Lara, F.T. (eds.), Law, Development and Innovation, SxI - Springer for Innovation \ SxI - Springer per l’Innovazione, Vol. 13, Springer International Publishing, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 25-38.

 

 

Book Title:
Law, Development and Innovation

Editors:
Prof. Dr. Giuseppe Bellantuono (University of Trento, Italy)
Prof. Fabiano Teodoro de Rezende Lara (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil)

Year:
2015

Series Title:
SxI - Springer for Innovation \ SxI - Springer per l’Innovazione

Series Volume:
13

Edition:
1st

Publisher:
Springer International Publishing

Copyright Holder:
Springer International Publishing Switzerland

Pages:
222

ISSN (Series)
2239-2688

DOI:
10.1007/978-3-319-13311-9

ISBN (Print)
978-3-319-13310-2

ISBN (Electronic)
978-3-319-13311-9

Status:
published

 

Description

This book deals with one strand of the intense debate concerning the links between law and development, namely the coordination of innovation processes and legal change. It analyzes how innovation, and ultimately development, can be fostered or hindered by existing or new legal infrastructures.

The book includes eleven original contributions from senior and junior scholars and is divided into two parts, the first focusing on theoretical frameworks and the second presenting several case studies on various institutional aspects. A particular strength of this part is its broad geographical coverage, which encompasses the legal frameworks in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia.

The contributions collected in this book will be of value to a broad readership. Academic scholars will find useful information on lessons learned from reforms implemented in different areas and come to better understand the methodological hurdles involved in reform assessment. Policymakers in national and international organizations can draw on these studies when designing new programs. Lastly, practitioners in developed and developing countries can use these contributions to promote the success of current or new initiatives.

Book
(download) (open)

Book Cover
(download) (open)

Table of Contents
(download) (open)

Chapter
(download) (open)

Book Flyer
(download) (open)

 
 

 

Dissertations

 

Essays on Economic Analysis of Competition Law: Theory and Practice

LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome (Italy)
Ph.D. Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Faculty of Economics
Academic Years 2010-2014

Chair of Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Supervisor: Prof. Roberto Pardolesi

Ph.D. Dissertation
(forthcoming)

Ph.D. Dissertation Defence
(download) (open)

 

The Antitrust Treatment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates in the EU Competition Law:
in Search of an Economic Approach and a Theory of Consumer Harm

University of Hamburg (Germany)
Ghent University (Belgium)
Erasmus Rotterdam University (The Netherlands)
European Master in Economic Analysis of Law
(one-year - 60 ECTS credit program)
Academic Year 2010-2011

Chair of Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Thomas Eger (University of Hamburg)
External Examiner: Prof. Dr. Elena Argentesi (University of Bologna)
final grade: 54/60 points (3rd best thesis)

Master Dissertation
(download) (open)

 

Competition and Regulation in the Electronic Communications Market:
Significant Market Power & Three Criteria Test

LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome (Italy)
Faculty of Economics
M.Sc. Master of Science Degree in Economic Analysis of Law
(two-years - 120 ECTS credit program)
Academic Years 2007-2009

Chair of Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Supervisor: Prof. Roberto Pardolesi
final grade: 110/110 with honors (summa cum laude)

M.Sc. Dissertation
(available upon request)

 

The Process of Liberalization of Gas Natural Market:
The Antitrust Judgement against ENI for Abuse of Dominant Position

LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome (Italy)
Faculty of Economics
B.Sc. Bachelor of Science in Economics
(three-years - 180 ECTS credit program)
Academic Years 2003-2006

Chair of Industrial Organization
Supervisor: Sen. Prof. Carlo Scognamiglio
final grade: 110/110 with honors (summa cum laude)

B.Sc. Dissertation
(available upon request)

 
 

 

Notes

 

State Aid: Main Developments

Authors
Mme. Alessandra Forzano (European Commission)
Dr. Danilo Samà (European Commission)

Editor
Competition Policy Newsletter
European Commission
Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP)

Keywords
Competition Policy, EU Case-Law, State Aids

Year
2012

Note
(download) (open) (journal)

 

The Italian Competition Authority fines three operators in the Southern Italian electric market for undertaking a concerted practice aimed at sharing the market for certain dispatch services (Repower Italy Dispatch Price)

Authors
Dr. Giacomo Luchetta (CEPS - Center for European Policy Studies)
Dr. Danilo Samà (European Commission)

Editor
Institute of Competition Law (e-Competitions - N°48229)

Keywords
Anticompetitive Agreement, Association of Undertakings, Bid Rigging, Cartel, Geographic Market, Hardcore Restriction, Limitation of Supply, Market Definition, Market Sharing, Objective Justification, Price Coordination

Year
2012

Note
(download) (open) (journal)

 

The Regional Administrative Court of Lazio confirms a fine imposed by the Italian NCA against the construction market leader for abuse of dominant position in the plasterboard market (Mercato del Cartongesso - Saint-Gobain)

Authors
Dr. Giacomo Luchetta (CEPS - Center for European Policy Studies)
Dr. Danilo Samà (European Commission)

Editor
Institute of Competition Law (e-Competitions - N°45898)

Keywords
Abuse of Dominance, Barriers to Entry, Dominance, Essential Facility, Geographic Market, Market Definition, Market Power, Relevant Market, Remedies, Unilateral Practices

Year
2011

Note
(download) (open) (journal)

 
 

 

Papers

 

Papers in English

 

Cartel Detection and Collusion Screening:
An Empirical Analysis of the London Metal Exchange

Abstract
In order to fight collusive behaviors, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s Law, otherwise known as First-Digit Law, which has been successfully employed to discover the “Libor Scandal” much time before the opening of the cartel settlement procedure. Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to apply a such useful instrument to track the price of the aluminium traded on the London Metal Exchange, following the allegations according to which there would be an aluminium cartel behind. As a result, quick tests such as Benford’s Law can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show signs of collusion. Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are commonly subject to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available, as warning system to identify cases that require further investigations.

Keywords
Benford’s Law, Cartel Detection, Collusion Screening, Competition Authorities, Data Manipulation, Monopolization, Oligopolistic Markets, Price Fixing, Variance Screen

JEL Classification
C10; D40; L13; L41

Editor
(under peer review in an international journal)

Working Paper
(download) (open)

 
 

The Effectiveness of Competition Policy:
An Econometric Assessment in Developed and Developing Countries

Abstract
The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an empirical literature aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition policy on economic growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest, such as Gross Domestic Product and Total Factor Productivity. As a result, the principal aim of the current work is to contribute to this branch of research, focusing on broader indicators of market performance, in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country.

Keywords
Competition Authorities, Competition Policy, Developed Countries, Developing Countries, Economic Development, Economic Growth, Law & Economics, Market Concentration, Market Efficiency, Market Performance, New Institutional Economics, Political Economy

JEL Classification
C21; C26; K21; L40

Editor
(under peer review in an international journal)

Working Paper
(download) (open)

 
 

The Antitrust Treatment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates in the EU Competition Law:
In Search of an Economic Approach and a Theory of Consumer Harm

Abstract
In the paper, the fundamental question is under what conditions loyalty discounts and rebates adopted by a dominant firm cause anti-competitive effects. Fidelity schemes, although extremely frequent in the market, if applied by a dominant firm, are likely to be judged as illegal per se, as demonstrated by the EU case-law delivered so far and the severe scrutiny reserved by the national competition authorities. As a result, the paper first provides an analytical overview of loyalty structures, focusing in particular on retroactive rebates, and elaborates on important economic implications, such as the lock-in and the suction effect. The work then discusses the novelties introduced by the Guidance Paper on the Application of Art. 102 of the TFEU, which calls for an effects-based analysis of exclusionary abuses. Therefore, after an in-depth evaluation of the as-efficient competitor test, the new approach of the European Commission towards loyalty discounts and rebates is discussed in details with reference to a controversial antitrust case recently examined at EU level (Tomra). The paper finally proposes a systematic economic framework for analysing the effects, and therefore the legality, of fidelity schemes, in the light of a consistent theory of consumer harm.

Keywords
Fidelity Discounts, Loyalty Rebates, Abuse of Dominant Position, As-Efficient Competitor Test, Consumer Harm, Exclusive Dealing, Foreclosure, Monopolization, Nonlinear Pricing, Predation, Tomra

JEL Classification
K21; L12; L42

Editor
(under peer review in an international journal)

Working Paper
(download) (open)

 
 

A Primer on Competition Policy, Cartel Enforcement and Leniency Program

Abstract
The present assessment focuses on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analyzing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements.

Keywords
Cartels Enforcement, Competition Policy, Game Theory, Leniency Program, Oligopolistic Markets

JEL Classification
C10; D40; L13; L41

Working Paper
(available upon request)

 
 

Papers in Italian

 

La Valutazione Antitrust degli Sconti Fedeltà nel Diritto Della Concorrenza Europeo:
Alla Ricerca di un Approccio Economico e di una Teoria del Danno per il Consumatore

Abstract
L’articolo si propone di comprendere in base a quali condizioni sconti fedeltà adottati da un’impresa dominante comportino effetti anticoncorrenziali. Gli schemi fidelizzanti, infatti, sebbene estremamente frequenti nelle transazioni di mercato, qualora applicati da un’impresa dominante, rischiano di essere giudicati illeciti per sé, come comprovato dalla casistica giurisprudenziale finora emersa a livello europeo e dal severo scrutinio riservato delle autorità nazionali della concorrenza. Il lavoro dapprima fornisce una panoramica analitica delle pratiche fidelizzanti, concentrando in particolare l’attenzione sugli sconti retroattivi, ed approfondisce importanti implicazioni economiche, come gli effetti lock-in e suction. Successivamente vengono discusse le novità introdotte dalle linee guida per l’applicazione dell’Art. 102 TFUE, le quali richiedono un’analisi concreta degli effetti di mercato delle condotte escludenti. Alla luce di un estensivo studio dell’as-efficient competitor test, il nuovo approccio della Commissione Europea verso gli sconti fedeltà viene analizzato in dettaglio con riferimento ad un caso antitrust recentemente esaminato a livello europeo (Tomra). In conclusione, viene sviluppato un approccio economico per l’analisi degli effetti, e dunque della legalità, degli schemi fidelizzanti, in conformità con una coerente teoria del danno per il consumatore.

Keywords
Sconti Fedeltà, Abuso di Posizione Dominante, Contratti di Esclusiva, Monopolizzazione, Prezzi Non Lineari, Prezzi Predatori, Teoria del Danno, Test del Concorrente Altrettanto Efficiente, Tomra

JEL Classification
K21; L12; L42

Journal
Mercato Concorrenza Regole

Editor
Il Mulino (Bologna - Italy)

Citation
Sama, D. (2013), Sconti Fedelta tra Approccio Economico e Danno per il Consumatore, Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Vol. XV, N. 2, Il Mulino, Bologna, Italy, pp. 237-266.

Working Paper
(download) (open)

Publication
(journal)

 
 
 
 


© Dr. Danilo Samà (2016) ®
www.danilosama.com