Home » Research

Research

 

Books

 

Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (CDC Cartel Damage Claims, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
In order to fight collusive behaviours, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s Law, otherwise known as First-Digit Law, which has been successfully employed to discover the “Libor Scandal” much time before the opening of the cartel settlement procedure. Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to apply a such useful instrument to track the price of the aluminium traded on the London Metal Exchange, following the allegations according to which there would be an aluminium cartel behind. As a result, quick tests such as Benford’s Law can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show signs of collusion. Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are commonly subject to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available, as warning system to identify cases that require further investigations.

Keywords:
Benford’s law, cartel detection, collusion screening, competition authorities, data manipulation, monopolization, oligopolistic markets, price fixing, variance screen

JEL classification:
C10; D40; L13; L41

Year:
2016

Pages:
203-212

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2016), Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange, in Kovač, Mitja, Vandenberghe, Ann-Sophie (eds.), Economic evidence in EU competition law, European Studies in Law and Economics, Vol. 18, Intersentia Ltd., Cambridge, United Kingdom, pp. 203-212.

D.O.I.:
10.1017/978-1-780-68740-7.012
[open]

 

 

Book title:
Economic evidence in EU competition law

Editors:
Prof. Dr Mitja Kovač, LL.M. (University of Ljubljana, Slovenia)
Prof. Dr Ann-Sophie Vandenberghe (Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands)

Year:
2016

Series title:
European Studies in Law and Economics

Series volume:
18

Edition:
1st

Publisher:
Intersentia Ltd.

Copyright holder:
Intersentia Ltd.

Pages:
460

D.O.I.:
10.1017/978-1-780-68740-7
[open]

ISBN (print):
978-1-780-68286-0
[open]

 

Description

The use of economic theory and economic evidence in competition cases, their appropriate interpretation, meaning, impact, usefulness and validity are among the most challenging issues that judges and legal practitioners are facing in their daily decision-making. Notorious questions of, for example, how courts, practitioners and other decision-making bodies should employ economic evidence and what weight (and credibility) should be attached to such evidence where different experts offer different suggestions are among the most complex ones. This book, while addressing such questions, provides tools for judges, scholars and legal practitioners to employ economic evidence in a more effective, optimal and predictable way so as to overcome the identified, EU-wide obstacles in enforcing current EU competition law.

This edited volume addresses the importance, implications, practices, problems and the role of economic evidence in EU competition law. It includes contributions on the use of the economic approach in the application and enforcement of EU competition law in different EU countries, candidate member states and third countries.

The book features scholars who are experts in the field of competition law and economics as well as several of the most prominent European judges who provide first-hand information on the use of economic evidence in practice. The book is not limited to a particular subfield of competition law, but covers the area of competition law at large, including state aid. This reflects the fact that also the European Commission has gradually expanded the application of the economic approach to all areas of competition law.

 

Reviews

«What role does economics play in cases of competition law? What role could it play? And what role should it play? But do scholarly experts and judges agree on these viewpoints? In this book an impressive variety of topics is covered and surprising insights are gained. Thus it really covers recent and partly controversial developments in the EU regarding the handling of competition law cases on a national as well as an EU level – something experts in the field must not miss».
Prof. Dr Wolfgang Weigel (University of Vienna)

«Economics is the study of scarcity. Law is the study of rights. Unfortunately, law and economics scholarship that is practical and focused on problems from the courtroom is scarce. This volume makes it right. It combines the legal experience of experts and judges in several European countries and the rigor of economics. The result is an indispensable tool for anyone interested in EU competition law».
Prof. Dr Shai Dothan, LL.M. (University of Copenhagen)

«The rapid growth and increasing importance of EU competition law have thrown up, in a context of decentralised interpretation and enforcement, questions of the extent to which economic theory and evidence should be employed by national authorities. This rich collection of essays provides diverse but also fascinating answers to those questions, ranging from the practical and pragmatic to the speculative and theoretical. It is all the more valuable because the authors are drawn from the judiciary as well as the academic world. Clearly the book is essential reading for all concerned with EU competition law».
Prof. Dr Anthony Ogus (University of Manchester and Erasmus University Rotterdam)

 

Table of contents
[download] [open]

Chapter
[download] [open]

Information online
[open]

 
 

Is competition policy useful for emerging countries? An empirical analysis

Authors:
Prof. Emeritus Roberto Pardolesi (LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome, Law & Economics LAB)
Dr Danilo Samà (CDC Cartel Damage Claims, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
The ultimate objective of the paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in emerging countries, focusing on broader indicators of market performance in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, hence an effective utility, on the level of competition of a developing country. From a policy perspective, the aim of the paper is also to assess whether the enforcement of a competition policy regime in a developing country has the same beneficial effects on the intensity of competition usually claimed to take place in the most developed countries. Relying upon a dataset and the connected econometric model developed by one of the authors, we provisionally conclude that in developing countries the institutional quality of the competition authorities matters more than the mere existence or the degree of competence for the effectiveness of a competition policy regime.

Keywords:
competition authorities, competition policy, developing countries, economic development, economic growth, law & economics, market concentration, market efficiency, market performance, new institutional economics, political economy

JEL classification:
C21; C26; K21; L40

Year:
2015

Pages:
25-38

Citation:
Pardolesi, Roberto, Samà, Danilo (2015), Is competition policy useful for emerging countries? An empirical analysis, in Bellantuomo, Giuseppe, de Rezende Lara, Fabiano Teodoro (eds.), Law, development and innovation, SxI - Springer for Innovation \ SxI - Springer per l’Innovazione, Vol. 13, Springer International Publishing, Geneva, Switzerland, pp. 25-38.

D.O.I.:
10.1007/978-3-319-13311-9_3
[open]

 

 

Book title:
Law, development and innovation

Editors:
Prof. Dr Giuseppe Bellantuono (University of Trento, Italy)
Prof. Fabiano Teodoro de Rezende Lara (Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil)

Year:
2015

Series title:
SxI - Springer for Innovation \ SxI - Springer per l’Innovazione

Series volume:
13

Edition:
1st

Publisher:
Springer International Publishing

Copyright holder:
Springer International Publishing Switzerland

Pages:
222

ISSN (series):
2239-2688

D.O.I.:
10.1007/978-3-319-13311-9
[open]

ISBN (print):
978-3-319-13310-2
[open]

ISBN (electronic):
978-3-319-13311-9
[open]

 

Description

This book deals with one strand of the intense debate concerning the links between law and development, namely the coordination of innovation processes and legal change. It analyses how innovation, and ultimately development, can be fostered or hindered by existing or new legal infrastructures.

The book includes eleven original contributions from senior and junior scholars and is divided into two parts, the first focusing on theoretical frameworks and the second presenting several case studies on various institutional aspects. A particular strength of this part is its broad geographical coverage, which encompasses the legal frameworks in Europe, the Americas, Africa, and Asia.

The contributions collected in this book will be of value to a broad readership. Academic scholars will find useful information on lessons learned from reforms implemented in different areas and come to better understand the methodological hurdles involved in reform assessment. Policymakers in national and international organizations can draw on these studies when designing new programs. Lastly, practitioners in developed and developing countries can use these contributions to promote the success of current or new initiatives.

 

Book
[download] [open]

Book cover
[download] [open]

Table of contents
[download] [open]

Chapter
[download] [open]

Book flyer
[download] [open]

Information online
[open]

 
 

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
The Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economic Analysis of Competition Law (XXV cycle), is the result of a scientific research in the field of the economic analysis of competition law developed through academic experiences at the Erasmus Rotterdam University in the Netherlands, the Ghent University in Belgium, the University of Hamburg in Germany and the Toulouse School of Economics in France, as well as through professional experiences as competition economist at the Antitrust Department of Pavia & Ansaldo and the Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission.

Keywords:
antitrust, competition economics, competition law, competition policy

JEL classification:
B21; C01; K21; L00; L4

Year:
2014

Pages:
1-124

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2014), Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-124.

 

 

Ph.D. dissertation
[download) [open]

Ph.D. dissertation defence
[download] [open]

 
 

 

Dissertations

 

Essays on economic analysis of competition law: theory and practice

LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome (Italy)
Ph.D. Doctor of Philosophy in Economic analysis of competition law
Faculty of Economics
Academic Years 2010-2014

Chair of Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Supervisor: Prof. Emeritus Roberto Pardolesi

Ph.D. dissertation
[download) [open]

Ph.D. dissertation defence
[download] [open]

 
 

The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm

University of Hamburg (Germany)
Ghent University (Belgium)
Erasmus Rotterdam University (The Netherlands)
European Master in Economic Analysis of Law
(one-year - 60 ECTS credit program)
Academic Year 2010-2011

Chair of Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Supervisor: Prof. Emeritus Dr Thomas Eger (University of Hamburg)
External examiner: Prof. Dr Elena Argentesi (University of Bologna)
Final grade: 54/60 points (3rd best thesis)

Master dissertation
[download] [open]

 
 

Competition and regulation in the electronic communications market: significant market power & three criteria test

LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome (Italy)
M.Sc. Master of Science Degree in Economic Analysis of Law
(two-years - 120 ECTS credit program)
Faculty of Economics
Academic Years 2007-2009

Chair of Economic Analysis of Competition Law
Supervisor: Prof. Emeritus Roberto Pardolesi
Final grade: 110/110 with honours (summa cum laude)

M.Sc. dissertation
(available upon request by e-mail)

 
 

The process of liberalization of gas natural market: the antitrust judgement against ENI for abuse of dominant position

LUISS “Guido Carli” University of Rome (Italy)
B.Sc. Bachelor of Science in Economics
(three-years - 180 ECTS credit program)
Faculty of Economics
Academic Years 2003-2006

Chair of Industrial Organization
Supervisor: Sen. Prof. Emeritus Carlo Scognamiglio
Final grade: 110/110 with honours (summa cum laude)

B.Sc. dissertation
(available upon request by e-mail)

 
 

 

Notes

 

First Italian judgment awarding damages against the European trucks cartel (Naples “Diego Armando Maradona” Stadium: Salernitana 1 - Juventus 0)

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (CDC Cartel Damage Claims)

Editors:
CDC Cartel Damage Claims
Lexology

Keywords:
cartels, competition law, competition policy, European trucks cartel, Italy, jurisdiction, limitation periods, private enforcement, quantification

JEL classification:
K21; L41

Year:
2021

Pages:
1-4

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2021), First Italian judgment awarding damages against the European trucks cartel (Naples “Diego Armando Maradona” Stadium: Salernitana 1 - Juventus 0), CDC Cartel Damage Claims Blog, Brussels, Belgium, and Lexology, Law Business Research, London, United Kingdom, 12 August 2021, pp. 1-4.

Note
[online (CDC)] [online (Lexology)]

 
 

State aid: main developments

Authors:
Ms Alessandra Forzano (European Commission)
Dr Danilo Samà (European Commission)

Editor:
Competition Policy Newsletter
European Commission
Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP)

Keywords:
competition policy, EU case-law, state aids

JEL classification:
K21; L44

Year:
2012

Pages:
19-25

Citation:
Forzano, Alessandra, Samà, Danilo (2012), State aid: main developments, Competition Policy Newsletter, Vol. 3, Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium, pp. 19-25.

Note
[download] [open] [journal]

 
 
The Italian Competition Authority fines three operators in the Southern Italian electric market for undertaking a concerted practice aimed at sharing the market for certain dispatch services (Repower Italy dispatch price)

Authors:
Dr Giacomo Luchetta (CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies)
Dr Danilo Samà (European Commission)

Editor:
Institute of Competition Law (e-Competitions - no. 48229)

Keywords:
anti-competitive agreement, association of undertakings, bid rigging, cartel, geographic market, hardcore restriction, limitation of supply, market definition, market sharing, objective justification, price coordination

JEL classification:
K21; L44

Year:
2012

Pages:
1-3

Citation:
Luchetta, Giacomo, Samà, Danilo (2012), The Italian Competition Authority fines three operators in the Southern Italian electric market for undertaking a concerted practice aimed at sharing the market for certain dispatch services (Repower Italy dispatch price), Institute of Competition Law, e-Competitions - no. 48229 Paris, France, New York, United States, London, United Kingdom, pp. 1-3.

Note
[download] [open] [journal]

 
 
The Regional Administrative Court of Lazio confirms a fine imposed by the Italian NCA against the construction market leader for abuse of dominant position in the plasterboard market (Mercato del cartongesso - Saint-Gobain)

Authors:
Dr Giacomo Luchetta (CEPS - Centre for European Policy Studies)
Dr Danilo Samà (European Commission)

Editor:
Institute of Competition Law (e-Competitions - no. 45898)

Keywords:
abuse of dominance, barriers to entry, dominance, essential facility, geographic market, market definition, market power, relevant market, remedies, unilateral practices

JEL classification:
K21; L44

Year:
2011

Pages:
1-3

Citation:
Luchetta, Giacomo, Samà, Danilo (2011), The Regional Administrative Court of Lazio confirms a fine imposed by the Italian NCA against the construction market leader for abuse of dominant position in the plasterboard market (Mercato del cartongesso - Saint-Gobain), Institute of Competition Law, e-Competitions - no. 45898, Paris, France, New York, United States, London, United Kingdom, pp. 1-3.

Note
[download] [open] [journal]

 
 

 

Papers

 

Papers in English language

 

Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
In order to fight collusive behaviours, the best scenario for competition authorities would be the possibility to analyze detailed information on firms’ costs and prices, being the price-cost margin a robust indicator of market power. However, information on firms’ costs is rarely available. In this context, a fascinating technique to detect data manipulation and rigged prices is offered by an odd phenomenon called Benford’s law, otherwise known as First-digit law, which has been successfully employed to discover the “Libor scandal” much time before the opening of the cartel settlement procedure. Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to apply a such useful instrument to track the price of the aluminium traded on the London Metal Exchange, following the allegations according to which there would be an aluminium cartel behind. As a result, quick tests such as Benford’s law can only be helpful to inspect markets where price patterns show signs of collusion. Given the budget constraints to which antitrust watchdogs are commonly subject to, a such price screen could be set up, just exploiting the data available, as warning system to identify cases that require further investigations.

Keywords:
Benford’s law, cartel detection, collusion screening, competition authorities, data manipulation, monopolization, oligopolistic markets, price fixing, variance screen

JEL classification:
C10; D40; L13; L41

Year:
2014

Pages:
1-18

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2014), Cartel detection and collusion screening: an empirical analysis of the London Metal Exchange, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-18.

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 

The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
The ultimate objective of the present paper is to empirically investigate the effectiveness of competition policy in developed and developing countries. Although its importance is continuously increasing, the effectiveness of competition policy still seems to lack the attention that it would deserve. At the present state of art, the number of academic contributions that attempts to estimate its impact on relevant economic variables appears very limited, in particular for the less developed countries. However, an empirical literature aimed at measuring in objective terms the effect of competition policy on economic growth is emerging, starting from narrow variables of interest, such as Gross Domestic Product and Total Factor Productivity. As a result, the principal aim of the current work is to contribute to this branch of research, focusing on broader indicators of market performance, in order to understand whether the presence of an antitrust authority has a significant impact, thus an effective utility, on the level of competition of a country.

Keywords:
competition authorities, competition policy, developed countries, developing countries, economic development, economic growth, law & economics, market concentration, market efficiency, market performance, new institutional economics, political economy

JEL classification:
C21; C26; K21; L40

Year:
2013

Pages:
1-50

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2013), The effectiveness of competition policy: an econometric assessment in developed and developing countries, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-50.

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 

The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
In the paper, the fundamental question is under what conditions loyalty discounts and rebates adopted by a dominant firm cause anti-competitive effects. Fidelity schemes, although extremely frequent in the market, if applied by a dominant firm, are likely to be judged as illegal per se, as demonstrated by the EU case-law delivered so far and the severe scrutiny reserved by the national competition authorities. As a result, the paper first provides an analytical overview of loyalty structures, focusing in particular on retroactive rebates, and elaborates on important economic implications, such as the lock-in and the suction effect. The work then discusses the novelties introduced by the Guidance Paper on the Application of Art. 102 of the TFEU, which calls for an effects-based analysis of exclusionary abuses. Therefore, after an in-depth evaluation of the as-efficient competitor test, the new approach of the European Commission towards loyalty discounts and rebates is discussed in detail with reference to a controversial antitrust case recently examined at EU level (Tomra). The paper finally proposes a systematic economic framework for analysing the effects, and therefore the legality, of fidelity schemes, in the light of a consistent theory of consumer harm.

Keywords:
fidelity discounts, loyalty rebates, abuse of dominant position, as-efficient competitor test, consumer harm, exclusive dealing, foreclosure, monopolization, nonlinear pricing, predation, Tomra

JEL classification:
K21; L12; L42

Year:
2012

Pages:
1-43

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2012), The antitrust treatment of loyalty discounts and rebates in the EU competition law: in search of an economic approach and a theory of consumer harm, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-43.

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 

The relationship between common management and ecotourism regulation: tragedy or triumph of the commons? A Law & Economics answer

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
Since its origin, ecotourism development has been at the centre of controversial and heated debates within the environmental and scientific society. On one hand, it has been considered as a model of responsible and sustainable tourism with the capacity to guarantee the conservation of the current biodiversity level and cultural identity, to educate the tourists about preservation and to improve the economic activity and the standard of living of the populations affected. On the other hand, it has been criticized for actually being a mere instrument in the hands of capitalist and western firms to commercially exploit the natural resources available in the less developed countries. Thus, are the ecotourism projects more likely to be profitable and successful in territories where the common resources are controlled by the state or managed by private firms? Considered the most frequent and spontaneous solution noticed in the ordinary daily life of the emerging countries, meaning natural resources owned communally by local institutions, does ecotourism impede or reinforce this management function of coordinating and controlling? The empirical researches conducted in literature tried to answer to some of the above-mentioned questions and offered the opportunity for a Law and Economics assessment of the problem related to the common-pool resources.

Keywords:
common-pool resources, commons management, development, ecology, environment, governance, property rights, regulation, sustainability, tragedy of the commons

JEL classification:
K11; K32; Q57

Journal:
Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics

Year:
2011

Pages:
78-81

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2011), The relationship between common management and ecotourism regulation: tragedy or triumph of the commons? A Law & Economics answer, Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS, Vol. 2, N. 1, pp. 78-81.

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 

Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency program

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University)

Abstract:
The present assessment focuses on the antitrust action in detecting and fighting oligopolistic collusion, analysing the development of the innovative and modern leniency policy. Following the examination of the main conditions and reasons for cartel stability and sustainability, our attempt is to comprehend under which circumstances leniency program represents a functional and successful tool for preventing the formation of anti-competitive agreements.

Keywords:
cartels enforcement, competition policy, game theory, leniency program, oligopolistic markets

JEL classification:
C70; K21; L13

Year:
2008

Pages:
1-12

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2008), Competition policy, cartel enforcement and leniency program, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-12.

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 

Papers in Italian language

 

Sconti fedeltà tra approccio economico e danno per il consumatore

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
L’articolo si propone di comprendere in base a quali condizioni sconti fedeltà adottati da un’impresa dominante comportino effetti anticoncorrenziali. Gli schemi fidelizzanti, infatti, sebbene estremamente frequenti nelle transazioni di mercato, qualora applicati da un’impresa dominante, rischiano di essere giudicati illeciti per sé, come comprovato dalla casistica giurisprudenziale finora emersa a livello europeo e dal severo scrutinio riservato delle autorità nazionali della concorrenza. Il lavoro dapprima fornisce una panoramica analitica delle pratiche fidelizzanti, concentrando in particolare l’attenzione sugli sconti retroattivi, ed approfondisce importanti implicazioni economiche, come gli effetti lock-in e suction. Successivamente vengono discusse le novità introdotte dalle linee guida per l’applicazione dell’Art. 102 TFUE, le quali richiedono un’analisi concreta degli effetti di mercato delle condotte escludenti. Alla luce di un estensivo studio dell’as-efficient competitor test, il nuovo approccio della Commissione Europea verso gli sconti fedeltà viene analizzato in dettaglio con riferimento ad un caso antitrust recentemente esaminato a livello europeo (Tomra). In conclusione, viene sviluppato un approccio economico per l’analisi degli effetti, e dunque della legalità, degli schemi fidelizzanti, in conformità con una coerente teoria del danno per il consumatore.

Keywords:
sconti fedeltà, abuso di posizione dominante, contratti di esclusiva, monopolizzazione, prezzi non lineari, prezzi predatori, teoria del danno, test del concorrente altrettanto efficiente, Tomra

JEL classification:
K21; L12; L42

Journal:
Mercato Concorrenza Regole

Editor:
Il Mulino (Bologna, Italy)

Year:
2013

Pages:
237-266

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2013), Sconti fedeltà tra approccio economico e danno per il consumatore, Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Vol. XV, N. 2, Il Mulino, Bologna, Italy, pp. 237-266.

D.O.I.:
10.1434/74504
[open]

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 

La valutazione antitrust degli sconti fedeltà nel diritto della concorrenza europeo: alla ricerca di un approccio economico e di una teoria del danno per il consumatore

Author:
Dr Danilo Samà (LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Law & Economics LAB)

Abstract:
L’articolo si propone di comprendere in base a quali condizioni sconti fedeltà adottati da un’impresa dominante comportino effetti anticoncorrenziali. Gli schemi fidelizzanti, infatti, sebbene estremamente frequenti nelle transazioni di mercato, qualora applicati da un’impresa dominante, rischiano di essere giudicati illeciti per sé, come comprovato dalla casistica giurisprudenziale finora emersa a livello europeo e dal severo scrutinio riservato delle autorità nazionali della concorrenza. Il lavoro dapprima fornisce una panoramica analitica delle pratiche fidelizzanti, concentrando in particolare l’attenzione sugli sconti retroattivi, ed approfondisce importanti implicazioni economiche, come gli effetti lock-in e suction. Successivamente vengono discusse le novità introdotte dalle linee guida per l’applicazione dell’Art. 102 TFUE, le quali richiedono un’analisi concreta degli effetti di mercato delle condotte escludenti. Alla luce di un estensivo studio dell’as-efficient competitor test, il nuovo approccio della Commissione Europea verso gli sconti fedeltà viene analizzato in dettaglio con riferimento ad un caso antitrust recentemente esaminato a livello europeo (Tomra). In conclusione, viene sviluppato un approccio economico per l’analisi degli effetti, e dunque della legalità, degli schemi fidelizzanti, in conformità con una coerente teoria del danno per il consumatore.

Keywords:
sconti fedeltà, abuso di posizione dominante, contratti di esclusiva, monopolizzazione, prezzi non lineari, prezzi predatori, teoria del danno, test del concorrente altrettanto efficiente, Tomra

JEL classification:
K21; L12; L42

Year:
2012

Pages:
1-45

Citation:
Samà, Danilo (2012), La valutazione antitrust degli sconti fedeltà nel diritto della concorrenza europeo: alla ricerca di un approccio economico e di una teoria del danno per il consumatore, Law & Economics LAB, LUISS “Guido Carli” University, Rome, Italy, pp. 1-45.

Paper
[download] [open]

 
 
 
 


© Dr Danilo Samà ®
Competition Economist (Ph.D.) | Paris (France)
E-mail: ds@danilosama.com | Website: www.danilosama.com
 MMXXII | 2022